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As a wide spectrum of the human activity rapidly transitions to a digital environment,
the need for secure and efficient communication intensifies. The currently used public key
distribution cryptosystems, such as the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) protocol, source their
security from the computational difficulty of certain mathematical problems. While widely
successful, the security these cryptosystems offer remains heuristic and the development
of Quantum computers may render them obsolete. The security that Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) guarantees, stems not from the mathematical complexity of the
encryption algorithms but from the laws of Quantum Physics. Implementations of QKD
protocols, however, rely on imperfect instruments and devices for information encoding,
transmission and detection. Device imperfections limit the rate of information exchange
and introduce vulnerabilities which can be exploited by a potential eavesdropper. This
work explores practical aspects of QKD as it matures beyond proof-of-principle experiments,
focusing on the Measurement Device Independent - QKD, a novel Quantum Communication
protocol that offers an exceptional balance between security and efficiency. At the heart
of the MDI-QKD lies the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference which characterizes the
indistinguishability of the photon states that the communicating parties independently send.
This study examines the HOM interference in a realistic lab environment and concludes that
exceptional interference visibility can be achieved using typical commercially available optical
devices and detectors, further demonstrating the applicability of the MDI-QKD protocol.
An important limiting factor for every Quantum Communication protocol is the
transmission medium. Fiber - based optical networks suffer significant losses that prohibit
Quantum Communication beyond metropolitan scales. While Free Space communication
is an attractive alternative for long distance communication, is susceptible to losses due
to the atmospheric Turbulence of the channel. As a means to improve the key generation
efficiency, this work examines and experimentally demonstrates the Prefixed-Threshold Real
Time Selection (P-RTS) scheme, which improves the free-space communication efficiency by





1.1 Historical overview of Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Modern block ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Public key distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 Diffie-Hellman-Merkle symmetric public key distribution . . . . . . . 5
1.3.2 RSA asymmetric public key distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.3 Elliptic curve Cryptography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 The one time pad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Quantum key distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5.1 The BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5.2 Entanglement as a source of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5.3 EPR - Ekert91 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5.4 BBM92 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.5 Time-reversed EPR protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.6 BB84 , EPR and time-reversed EPR are equivalent . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.6 Thesis outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Quantum hacking and counter-measures 16
2.1 Attacks on source imperfections; phase randomization and the photon number
splitting attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 The decoy state QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Attacks on detector side imperfections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Device Independent QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Measurement-Device-Independent QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Experimental decoy state BB84 quantum key distribution using the
prefixed-threshold real-time selection method 29
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
iii
3.2 Key generation in a turbulent channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 All-fiber turbulence simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5 Experimental procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 Toward measurement-device independent quantum key distribution over
turbulent channels; Hong-Ou-Mandel interference 42
4.1 Motivation, importance of HOM interferometers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Parameterizing the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference visibility . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5 Future extensions of this work 55
5.1 P-RTS method for the MDI-QKD protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2 Quantum position verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.3 Reconfigurable QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Bibliography 58
Appendices 68
A Calculation of the H.O.M. Visibility parametrization 69




1.1 Example of a mono-alphabetic cipher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Example of the Vigènere cipher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Principle of the BB84 protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Bits sent by Alice , encoded as polarization states on randomly selected bases. 27
3.1 Dark Count probability per gate of each Single Photon Avalance Detector of
Figure 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Detection Setup parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
v
List of Figures
1.1 AES, principle of operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 CHSH inequalities from the Classical and Quantum point of view. . . . . . . 10
1.3 Ekert91 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Time-Reversed EPR protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5 Equivalence between EPR , Time-Reversed EPR and BB84 protocols. . . . . 14
2.1 Time shift attack and Phase remapping attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 MDI-QKD schematic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Linearity of the The RGLLP rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 BB84 over turbulent channels, schematic of the experimental setup. . . . . . 34
3.3 Schematic of the Polarization Modulation setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Fits to extract the background noise parameters for each detector. . . . . . . 36
3.5 Fit to determine the modulator’s Vπ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6 Error rate in the rectilinear basis while applying increasing transmittance
cutoffs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.7 Secure Key rate at 17db loss, while applying increasing transmittance cutoffs. 40
4.1 Schematic of the HOM set-up. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Schematic of the experimental setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Histograms of the detection probability. The fits are used to extract the total
afterpulse Probability for each detector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4 HOM Visibility vs the applied Dead-time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.5 H.O.M. Visibility vs the effective photon number each pulse contains. . . . . 51
4.6 H.O.M. vs the Intensity Mismatch between the incoming pulses. . . . . . . . 52
4.7 H.O.M. Visibility vs the mismatch in the Polarization of the icoming pulses. 53
5.1 P-RTS for MDI-QKD in turbulent channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57




1.1 Historical overview of Cryptography
Cryptography presents a rich, more than two millenia history [1] describing the methods of
secret communication. A neck-and-neck race between codemakers and codebrakers, between
cryptographs and cryptanalysts, gradually evolved Cryptography form art to science. The
encryption method requires an algorithm, which is called the Cipher, to reversibly convert
the communicated message, which is called the Plaintext, to a text that seems devoid of any
meaning called Ciphertext. The encryption is performed following a set of instructions or
keyword, simply called the Key and the legitimate receiver, who must also have knowledge of
the key, can use it to decrypt, i.e. reverse the encryption and read the intended message. The
goal of Cryptography is the ciphertext to be completely meaningless to someone intercepting
it, without having knowledge of the encryption key.
Caesar’s substitution cipher, was the first well known encryption method, where the
alphabet is shifted down a fixed number of steps creating a substitution rule. For example if
the the alphabet is shifted by three steps the rule becomes a→D, b→E, c→F etc. Caesar’s
cipher is very simple to break since at most 26 trials (for the English alphabet) can reveal the
number of steps the alphabet was shifted, but is part of a greater category of substitution
encryption algorithms called mono-alphabetic ciphers. For such a cipher, typically a key
word or phrase is chosen where spaces and repeating letters are removed. For example for
the key word "THE ART OF CRYPTOGRAPHY" the cipher alphabet begins as "THEAROFCYPG"
and then followed by the remaining letters in the right order, as shown in the example of
Table 1.1.
Mono-alphabetic ciphers, being simple and efficient, dominated the art of secret writing
for the first millennium A.D. Their breaking is attributed to the ninth-century polymath
Al-Kindi, by employing a statistical analysis on the characters of the ciphertext. The
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Table 1.1: Example of a mono-alphabetic cipher for the key word
"THE ART OF CRYPTOGRAPHY".
Plain Alphabet a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
Cipher Alphabet T H E A R O F C Y P G I J K L M N Q S U V W X Y Z B
cryptanalysis relies on specific linguistic traits of each language. For example in English
the letters e,t,a appear in exceptionally high frequencies, while the letters j,q,z in
exceptionally low.
By the 16th century mono-alphabetic ciphers had proven unreliable and the need for
secure communication led to the development of polyalphabetic encryption methods, called
Vigenère ciphers. The construction of a Vigenère encryption table begins with a repeating
keyword. Each letter of the keyword dictates which cipher-alphabet would be used for
the encryption of a plain-text letter. Although the Vigenère cipher remained unbreakable
for more than four centuries, it contained a vulnerability: the repetition of the keyword
introduced repeating patterns in the ciphertext. Charles Babbage and Friedrich Kasiski, in
the 19th century were the first to recognize these patterns and cryptanalyze (Kasiski’s test)
the Vigenère cipher.
At the turn of the 20st century, the development of the radio telegram by Guglielmo
Marconi and the outbreak of WWI intensified the search for more secure ciphers, for
example the Playfair and the ADFGVX, but each time slight repetitions and patterns
would give the nooks and crannies the cryptanalysts needed to latch on. Towards WWII
encryption employed complex electro-mechanical devices. In response cryptanalysts build
complex machines like the “Bomba” by Marian Rejewski, the “Bombe” project led by Alan
Turing and Gordon Welchman and the “Colossus” project led by Tommy Flowers, which had
tremendous impact in the outcome of the war and became the blueprint for the development
of the modern computers. In the years post the war, computers became cheaper and more
powerful and were employed in the development of more complex encryption block ciphers
such as the DES (Data Encryption Standard), the GOST and since 2000, the AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard)[2].
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Table 1.2: Example of the Vigènere cipher. The plaintext "the unbreakable cipher"
is encrypted with the key word "vigenere". The keyword letters and their corresponding
cipher-alphabets are highlighted in the Vigère table below.
Key v i g e n e r e v i g e n e r e v i g e
Plaintext t h e u n b r e a k a b l e c i p h e r
Ciphertext O P K Y A F I I V S G F Y I T M K P K V
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
A
∣∣ A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
B
∣∣ B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A
C
∣∣ C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B
D
∣∣ D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
E
∣∣ E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D
F
∣∣ F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E
G
∣∣ G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F
H
∣∣ H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G
I
∣∣ I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H
J
∣∣ J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I
K
∣∣ K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J
L
∣∣ L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K
M
∣∣ M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L
N
∣∣ N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M
O
∣∣ O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
P
∣∣ P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
Q
∣∣ Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
R
∣∣ R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q
S
∣∣ S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
T
∣∣ T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
U
∣∣ U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T
V
∣∣ V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
W
∣∣ W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
X
∣∣ X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W
Y
∣∣ Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
Z
∣∣ Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y
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1.2 Modern block ciphers
The core algorithm of a block cipher, first divides the plaintext data into fixed size blocks,
(128bits per block for the AES). Each block undergoes multiple rounds of a sequence
of “scrambling”operations, called Substitution-Permuation Networks (SPN). In particular
for the AES, which currently is the most commonly used standard, each 128 bit block is
organized in a 4× 4 byte array. Then multiple rounds of the following SPN are applied, as
described in Figure 1.1. The SPN is summarized as follows.
1. The internal state is XORed with a round key, different for each round.
2. (Substitution part): Each byte {s0, . . . , s15} is substituted with an other byte according
to a preconstructed lookup table. To ensure strong encryption this lookup table should
be highly non-linear and without any statistical bias.
3. (Permutation part). Row shifting: The ith row is shifted i positions, i ∈ {0, . . . , 3}.
4. (Permutation part). Column Mixing: A linear transformation is applied to all the
elements of each column.
Although the core algorithm of a block cipher provides very strong encryption, an improper
mode of operation may compromise the communication security. A safe mode of operation
is the Cipher Block Chaining, where the encryption of each block depends on the ciphertext
of its previous block.
By the 1970s, encryption ciphers had become strong enough to provide secure commu-
nication, but the key distribution still relied on primitive methods such as trusted couriers.

































































XORed state Subsitution Row shift Column mixing
Figure 1.1: AES, principle of operation. (a) The initial 4×4 byte state is XORed with the
round key. (b) Each byte is substituted according to the cipher’s lookup table (c) Each row
of the block is shifted (d) a linear transformation is applied to the members of each column
(shown with the same shade)
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1.3 Public key distribution
1.3.1 Diffie-Hellman-Merkle symmetric public key distribution
Based on the ideas of Ralph Merkle [3], Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman proposed
a protocol where the communicating parties named Alice and Bob from now on, establish
securely a shared key via a public channel [4]. The Diffie-Hellman-Merkle protocol is outlined
as follows:
1. Alice and Bob choose publicly a suitable prime number p and an integer g where g is
a primitive root modulo p.
2. Alice chooses an integer a and Bob chooses an integer b. Numbers a and b belong in
the multiplicative group of integers modulo p, Z∗p . Both keep their numbers secret.
3. Alice sends publicly the number A = gamodp. Likewise, Bob sends publicly the number
B = gamodp. Noting that numbers A and B are simple to calculate no matter the size
of the prime number p.






Bob calculates Kb = A
b mod p = (ga mod p)b mod p.




modp = (ga mod p)b mod p , therefore Alice and
Bob share now a common secret number K.
6. An eavesdropper to calculate K , needs either a or b, but to find them needs to solve
A = gamodp or B = gamodp given A,B, g, p. This is the discrete logarithm problem
which is computationally difficult to solve. To increase the randomness of their common
secret and thus the communication security the two parties use the hash of the number
K they share.
The DHM protocol needs separate authentication of the legitimate participants, otherwise
it is vulnerable to man-the-middle attacks. The DHM presents also some practical
inefficiencies. To eliminate the possibility of smaller subgroups within Z∗p [5] the prime
number p should be chosen such as p−1
2
is also prime and so the generation of suitable public
numbers does not scale efficiently, especially in cases were an entity needs to communicate
securely with multiple parties. In [4] is also introduced the idea of asymmetric key
distribution where the encryption key is different from the key used in decryption.
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1.3.2 RSA asymmetric public key distribution
The first implementation of asymmetric key distribution was developed by Ron Rivest, Adi
Shamir, and Leonard Adleman (RSA)[6]. The method utilizies numbers from the group Z∗n
of all numbers co-prime with n and with ϕ (n) is the Euler’s totient function, giving the
order of the group i.e. the number of elements in Z∗n as
ϕ (n) = (p1 − 1)× (p2 − 1)× . . .× (pm − 1)
The protocol employs a mathematical object called trapdoor permutation where encrypting
the plain number P to the cipher number C is easy using the public key, but extremely
difficult to calculate P from C without knowledge of the private key (trapdoor). The method
begins from the observation that for every integer number k, which is the message, we can
find efficiently three large numbers (n, e, d) that satisfy
k = (ke modn)d mod n (1.1)
The numbers (e, n) consist the public key. The trapdoor number d is chosen as to satisfy
ed = 1 mod ϕ (n) , therefore the exponent e must be less than ϕ (n). This trapdoor must be
kept secret, in possession of Alice and can be calculated only if the factorization of n = p× q
or equivalently the function ϕ (n) is known. They key exchange proceeds as follows.
1. Bob encrypts his message k to a ciphertext c as c = ke modn.
2. Alice receives the message and deciphers it as k = cd modn
The security of the RSA stems from the difficulty of both the Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP) and the integer factorization problem, since an eavesdropper in order to intercept
the message k needs to either solve c = ke mod n (DLP) or calculate the factorization
n = p× q which is directly related to the secret exponent d. For sufficiently large numbers n
, at least 2048 bits for modern encryption schemes, it is practically impossible to determine
the factorization n = p× q. The security of the RSA is heuristic in the sense that it has not
been possible yet to solve the factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem. A
plethora of attacks on RSA exist that exploit either side channel timing attacks or faults in
the implementation [7, 8, 9].
1.3.3 Elliptic curve Cryptography.
Introduced in 1985 Elliptic Curve Cryptography [10, 11] offered a more powerful and efficient
public key distribution protocol. ECC utilizes pairs of natural numbers from the field Zp
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where p is a prime number that satisfy the Elliptic Curve equation.
y2 = x3 + a · x+ b (1.2)
The security of the ECC protocol stems from the difficulty of the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm problem: find the number k given a base point Q and a public point P where
P = kQ. The Key agreement is similar to the Diffie-Hellmann method:
1. For a public point Q, Alice selects a random secret number and computes PA = dAQ.
She sends PA to Bob.
2. Bob selects a random secret number and computes PB = dBQ. He sends PB to Bob.
3. Both share the secret dAPB = dBPA = dAdBQ
The security of ECC strongly depends on the choice of the coefficients a and b.
1.4 The one time pad
There is one cipher that is provably secure, immune to any brute force attacks, the One-
Time-Pad (OTP) [12]. The security of the OTP is perfect in the sense that an adversary
in possession of the ciphertext C cannot gain any information about the plaintext P i.e.
H (P ) = H (P |C). If the plaintext , ciphertext and key are represented in binary than the
OTP encryption is implemented as a bitwise XOR operation, C = P  K and decryption
C  K = P  K  K = P . To achieve perfect secrecy the OTP Key has to meet certain
requirements. (i) The key has to be at least the same size as the message. If the message
has length m and the key is shorter with length k where k < m, then part of it has to be
reused and an attacker can rule out all 2m−k plain-texts. (ii) The key has to be truly random
and (iii) it has to be used only once. If the same a key is reused an adversary in possession
of the cipher-texts can gain partial information. For example if the key K is used for both
plain-texts P1 and P2 to encrypt C1 = P1 K and C2 = P2 K , an eavesdropper can know
C1  C2 = P1 K  P2 K = P1  P2. The OTP is also known as the Vernar cipher.
1.5 Quantum key distribution.
The security of the RSA and DHM protocols relies on the mathematical difficulty of
the integer factorization and discrete logarithms problems. Shor’s quantum algorithm
[13] can solve these problems, thus the development of quantum computers may render
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classical Cryptography protocols obsolete. Within the framework of Quantum physics
it is impossible for an Eavesdropper to distinguish non-orthogonal quantum states by
any means of measurement due to the uncertainty principle. Equally impossible is any
attempt to perform any kind of local measurement on an entangled state shared by the
legitimate communicating parties, without disturbing their non-local correlations. These
properties are uniquely quantum with no classical analogue can provide in principle provable
unconditional communication security, unlike the heuristic security provided by the classical
key distribution protocols.
1.5.1 The BB84 protocol
The first protocol utilizing the properties of quantum physics for secure communication
was proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984 (BB84)[14]. A common
implementation requires the information to be encoded on the polarization states of light
pulses. We can assume for example that the bit 0 is encoded as |→〉 in the + basis and |↗〉
in the × basis and likewise the bit 1 is encoded as |↑〉 in the + basis and |↖〉 in the × basis,
the protocol would proceed as follows.
1. Alice randomly selects the bits to prepare. If they intend to create a key of length n,
then at least (4 + δ)n bit should be prepared.
2. Alice randomly selects the basis on which she encodes her bits and sends the
appropriate state one by one, over an authenticated public channel. Table 1.3.
3. Bob receives the pulses that have traveled through the quantum channel and randomly
chooses the basis to perform his measurement.
4. Alice and Bob communicate over an authenticated public channel and compare the
basis choice for each bit. They keep only the events where they used the same base,
which are 2n with high probability.
5. They publicly reveal and compare n bits to determine the Quantum Bit Error Rate
their strings exhibit and if it is above an acceptable threshold they abort the protocol.
Otherwise they proceed to correct any errors between their shared keys by applying a
classical error reconciliation scheme [15].
6. At this point Alice and Bob share with high probability identical key strings, but Eve
may have some partial information on them either because she was eavesdropping or
because of the information publicized during the reconciliation process. Alice and
8
Table 1.3: Principle of the BB84 protocol.
12 random bits sent by Alice
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Random Bit 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Random basis + + × + + + × + × + × +
Alice sends → ↑ ↖ → ↑ ↑ ↖ → ↖ → ↖ →
Bob receives the qubits
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Random basis × + × × + × + + × × × +
Bob observes ↗ ↑ ↖ ↖ ↑ ↗ ↑ → ↖ ↗ ↖ →
public discussion ↑ ↖ ↑ → ↖ ↖ →
raw key 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Bob can perform privacy amplification [16] to bound any possible information an
Eavesdropper may have on their shared key.
1.5.2 Entanglement as a source of information
Entanglement describes the joint state of two or more qubits which is not separable. This
means the joint state of qubits A and B is entangled if and only if
|ψ〉 6= |ψA〉 |ψB〉 (1.3)
Entangled states allow non-local correlations [17] which are purely a quantum property and
cannot be classically replicated offering a fundamental new way for two parties to share
information. For example if Alice and Bob share a Bell state of eq.(1.4) and eq.(1.5) with
each possessing a qubit, then if Alice performs a measurement on her qubit, she instantly











(|0A0B〉 − |1A1B〉) (1.5)
The unique quantum nature of the correlations offered by entangled states are manifested
through the violation of Bell inequalities [18] and their modern way to present them the
9
Clauser, Horne, Shimony, Holt (CHSH) games [19], Figure 1.2. First, looking the two particle
distribution from a classical point of view, assume that a middleman delivers Alice and Bob
each a classical particle. Alice chooses randomly to measure either the quantity Q or R
with outcomes ±1 (reflecting on the eigenvalues of Ẑ on the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and of X̂ on
the {|+〉 , |−〉} basis). Similarly Bob chooses randomly to measure either the quantity S or
T with outcomes ±1. Alice and Bob examine the correlator QR + RS + RT − QT . In the
classical point of view the operators Q,R, S, T merely reveal the already existing state values
q, r, s, t. Then the average value is




p (q, r, s, t) · (qr + rs+ rt− qt) (1.6)
which leads to the Bell inequalities
− 2 ≤ E (QS) + E (RS) + E (RT )− E (QT ) ≤ 2 (1.7)
If we re-examine now the same problem from the Quantum point of view, the source in the
middle now provides Bell state qubits Alice and Bob. Alice randomly measures the observable
Q̂ = Ẑa ,i.e. the {0◦, 90◦} basis, or the observable R̂ = X̂a ,i.e. the {45◦, 135◦} basis.





,i.e. the {67.5◦, 157.5◦}





,i.e. the {22.5◦, 112.5◦} basis as shown in Figure
1.2.
Alice
Q = ±1&R = ±1
Bob










Figure 1.2: CHSH inequalities from the Classical and Quantum point of view.
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Given the Bell state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) , the form of the operators Q̂, R̂, Ŝ, T̂ , with
〈·〉 = 〈ψ| · |ψ〉 , and the action of the Pauli operators,
X̂ |0〉 = |1〉 X̂ |1〉 = |0〉
Ẑ |0〉 = |0〉 X̂ |1〉 = − |1〉 (1.8)


















The correlator of eq.(1.9) clearly violates the classical inequality of eq.(1.7). In fact as
the Tsirelson’s inequality shows, the violation of eq.(1.9) is the maximum possible. By
performing the CHSH test, i.e. by measuring the correlator of eq.(1.9), two communicating
parties can determine whether they share qubits of an entangled state. What allows
entangled states to be used as source for secure information is the property of entanglement
monogamy [20, 17], if the two parties establish that they share a maximally entangled state
|ψ〉AB, then the state |ψ〉E an eavesdropper holds would be completely uncorrelated,
|ψ〉ABE = |ψ〉AB  |ψ〉E (1.10)
Moreover the entanglement monogamy can be quantified. If the two parties discover they
share a partially entangle state , they can bound the degree of correlation an eavesdropper
may have, through means of the Coffman, Kundu, Wootters inequality [21, 22].
1.5.3 EPR - Ekert91 protocol
In the BB84 protocol, the key bits originate from states prepared by Alice. By using
maximally entangled states Alice and Bob can generate a shared, secure key in the scheme






(|HV 〉AB + |V H〉AB) (1.11)
Alice measures the polarization with the basis being randomly chosen between the {0◦, 90◦}
or the {45◦, 135◦} basis. Likewise, Bob measures the polarization in the {0◦, 90◦},
{22.5◦, 112.5◦} or the {67.5◦, 157.5◦} basis. In post-processing they publicly discuss their
basis choice. When the both use the rectilinear {0◦, 90◦} basis they use the bits to construct
the shared key. When they both record an event, but used different basis, they perform the












Figure 1.3: Ekert91 protocol. When Alice and Bob, both use the rectilinear basis they
convert their measurements to the secret key.
entanglement guarantees that an eavesdropper, even if is the one that creates the EPR pair,
can not gain any information without being detected.
1.5.4 BBM92 protocol
In a simplified version if Ekert’s protocol, Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [25] consider the
source to still produce EPR pairs but the need to perform a Bell inequality test is removed.
Alice and Bob receive their qubits and each measure in either the rectilinear or diagonal
basis, randomly chosen. In post-processing they publicly compare their basis choice and keep
events when only both successfully detected using the same basis. The security is guaranteed
because even if the Eavesdropper controls the production and distribution of the EPR pairs,
she cannot create a state that is correlated to the state Alice and Bob receive, without
disturbing the statistics that Alice and Bob expect, as discussed in 1.5.6. The protocol
implicitly assumes that Alice’s and Bob’s detection systems can perform measurements
flawlessly.
1.5.5 Time-reversed EPR protocol
In Ekert91 and BBM protocols, someone in the middle, who may even be untrusted, prepares
maximally entangled EPR states and sends Alice and Bob each, one qubit. Performing the
reverse procedure still enables two parties to generate a secure key as described in the time-
reversed EPR protocol [26]. Alice and Bob each prepare independently a random BB84 state:
Horizontal, Vertical, Diagonal, Anti-diagonal (|H〉 , |V 〉 , |D〉 , |A〉). Each sends his/her state
to a middleman Charlie who perform a Bell state discrimination measurement, Figure 1.4.
When Charlie announces a successful Bell state projection, Alice and Bob publicly compare
the basis they used, and if it is the same, they know how their bits are correlated while









Figure 1.4: Time-Reversed EPR protocol.
false Bell state projections, Alice and Bob can identify this during their public discussion.
The security of the time-reversed protocol is proven in [27].
1.5.6 BB84 , EPR and time-reversed EPR are equivalent
The three protocols, BB84, EPR and time-reversed EPR are in fact equivalent, the security
of one scheme implies the security of the others. For example we can assume that Alice and
Charlie are given the EPR pair |Ψ〉AC1 =
1√
2
(|HV 〉+ |V H〉) and Bob and Charlie are given
the pair |Ψ〉BC2 =
1√
2
(|HV 〉+ |V H〉). If Charlie is trying to intercept the communication





(|HV 〉AC + |V H〉AC) 
1√
2





|HH〉AB  |V V 〉C + |HV 〉AB  |V H〉C
+ |V H〉AB  |HV 〉C + |V V 〉AB  |HH〉C
)
 Ainit (1.13)
His most general attack would be to apply a Unitary transformation U to entangle his





|HH〉AB  |V V 〉C  A1 + |HV 〉AB  |V H〉C  A2
+ |V H〉AB  |HV 〉C  A3 + |V V 〉AB  |HH〉C  A4
)
(1.14)
The measurement performed by the center corresponds to a projection onto the state





α∗ |HH〉AB  A1 + β∗ |HV 〉AB  A2











EPR Time-Reversed EPR BB84
Figure 1.5: Equivalence between EPR , Time-Reversed EPR and BB84 protocols. Two
EPR pairs are being distributed to Alice Bob and Charlie. The order in which the projective
measurements are performed, determines which protocol is implemented.
In order for the eavesdropper to escape detection, the general state must be an eigenstate
of σAZσ
B
Z with eigenvalue −1 and eigenstate of σAXσBX with eigenvalue +1. As eigenstate of
σAZσ
B




(β∗ |HV 〉AB  A2 + γ∗ |V H〉AB  A3) (1.16)
As an eigenstate of σAXσ
B




c∗ (|HV 〉AB + |V H〉AB)  AC (1.17)
So even in the most general attack, the untrusted center cannot inconspicuously correlate
his state to Alice’s and Bob’s shared state. Noting that in the above the order in which each
party perform their measurement does not matter justifying the equivalence of the three
protocols, displayed in Figure 1.5.
1.6 Thesis outline
The content of this work is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 discusses loopholes and exploits that realistic device imperfections may intro-
duce into Quantum Communication schemes. The Measurement-Device-Independent
QKD protocol is introduced as a means of defending against any possible Quantum
Hacking attacks that target vulnerabilities on the detection instruments.
• Chapter 3 presents our study on the applicability of selection methods in free-space
Quantum communication protocols. We simulate the transmittance profile of a
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turbulent channel and apply the Prefixed -Threshold selection method on the decoy-
state BB84 as an intermediate step towards future implementations for the MDI-QKD
protocol. We demonstrate significant improvement on the generated key rate while the
implementation does not require any significant technological upgrades.
• Chapter 4 presents an extensive study on realistic implementations of the Hong-Ou-
Mandel (HOM) interference. We demonstrate that exceptional HOM interference
visibility can be achieved using of the shelf optical components. Since HOM interference
is at the heart of the MDI-QKD protocol, this study demonstrates the feasibility of
MDI-QKD in realistic applications.
• Chapter 5 discusses three possible future extensions of this work: MDI-QKD over
turbulent channels, Quantum Position Verification and Reconfigurable QKD. The
successful implementation of the P-RTS selection methods and the study on the H.O.M.
interference immediately extend to the experimental demonstration of the MDI-QKD
protocol over turbulent channels. Quantum Position Verification offers a quantum
solution to the authentication problem. Reconfigurable QKD is an adaptive protocol
that switches between the more efficient BB84 or the more secure MDI-QKD depending





Quantum Key Distribution provides in principle unconditionally secure communication
between two legitimate parties. The security is proved based on the laws of quantum
physics. However, any security proof requires certain assumptions which in practice cannot
always be fulfilled. Imperfections on the implementation of the protocol may insert loopholes
that compromise the communication security. Such imperfections, when recognized, can be
included in the security proof such as the G.L.L.P. proof [28]. The pessimistic assumptions
though in the GLLP proof reduce the key generation efficiency significantly. Alternatively,
the protocol can be modified to pro-actively counter certain attacks as is done with Phase
randomization and the decoy state method 2.2. Finally the system can be patched against
specific attacks but these patches in turn could open potential unrecognised loopholes. The
constant threat that implementation imperfections pose, drove the development of QKD
protocols that remove the dependence on the devices that realize thm, such as the Device
Independent QKD, section 2.4 and the Measurement Device Independent QKD, section 2.5.
2.1 Attacks on source imperfections; phase randomiza-
tion and the photon number splitting attack
Quantum communication protocols encode information on modes of the electromagnetic
field, with most commonly used the Polarization of single photons or their phase difference
from a reference pulse. Single photons sources can exist using spontaneous parametric down
conversion but using weak coherent states realized as attenuated laser pulses is far more
16







where α = |α| eıθ and |α|2 = µ the average photon number and θ its phase. To remove the




























e−µ |n〉 〈n| (2.4)
which is interpreted as a classical mixture of number states |n〉 following a Poissonian
distribution. In practice, phase randomization is implemented with a Phase Modulator
driven at ∼ kHZ frequencies at random amplitudes.
As the photon number follows a Poissonian distribution, there is a probability pm (µ) =
1 − e−µ − µe−µ of pulses with multiple photons. For example for a typical average photon
number µ = 0.3 , about 3.7% of the pulses contain n ≥ 2 photons. This can be exploited in
the powerful Photon Number Splitting attack [30, 31, 32] where the communication occurs
in a lossy channel. An eavesdropper in principle can replace the lossy channel with a lossless
one, block part or all of the single photon pulses, since she can not intercept any information
from them, split the multi-photon pulses keeping a fraction of photons and wait the public
basis discussion to perform her measurement in the correct basis. The strength of the attack
is that Eve can completely reproduce Poissonian statistics and depending on the channel
loss and the pulse average photon number, she can even intercept the complete key without







Eve’s strategy first is to block a fraction b of the single photon pulses, creating a distribution
PPNS [n] =

(1 + bµ) e−µ n = 0
((1− b)µ+ µ2/2) e−µ n = 1
µn+1
(n+1)!
e−µ n > 1
(2.6)
The value of b is fixed by the condition that the two distributions must give the same vacuum
signal probability Ploss [n] = PPNS [0] at bmatch =
1
µ
eµ[(1−η)−1]. The resulting distribution is
not yet Poissonian, but Eve can still replicate Poissonian statistics by removing additional
photons from higher multiphoton pulses. The necessary and sufficient condition for Eve
to perform the photon redistribution is that
∑n
i=0 PPNS [n] ≤
∑n
i=0 Ploss [n], which allows
photon transfer from higher to lower photon numbers. This condition can easily be fulfilled
for a wide range of realistic transmittance η and mean photon µ parameters.
Such attack can be realized with linear optics [33] or by performing a quantum non-
demolition measurement to determine the photon number in the pulse. The attacker does
not gain information about the polarization , but the polarization mode is preserved. Eve
waits until the public discussion to perform the measurement in the correct basis on her
preserved photons. To split one photon, Eve can employ the unitary Û
(n)
PNS to transfer one
photon to modes that she retains.
Û
(n)
PNS |n, 0, 0, 0〉 = |n− 1, 0, 1, 0〉 (2.7)
Û
(n)
PNS |0, n, 0, 0〉 = |0, n− 1, 0, 1〉 (2.8)













. She uses a three level atomic system, with ground state |g〉
and excited states |e1〉 , |e2〉 and atomic excitation operators σ†1, σ†2.
a1σ
†
1 |n, 0, 0, 0〉 |g〉 = |n− 1, 0, 0, 0〉 |e1〉 (2.9)
b†1σ1 |n− 1, 0, 0, 0〉 |e1〉 = |n− 1, 0, 1, 0〉 |g〉 (2.10)
Source imperfections were included in the theoretical proof GLLP [28], where pessimisti-
cally it was assumed that all multi-photon pulses emitted by Alice, are received by Bob
Yn = 1, for n ≥ 2. In the previous the Yield Yn is the probability that a pulse containing n
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photons will eventually give a detection event. The extracted secure key rate RGLLP is







−Qµ ·H2 (Eµ) (2.11)
Where Qµ is the gain ,i.e. the detection rate, of the signal, Eµ is the error rate for the signal
, Ω = 1− pmulti
Qµ
is the fraction of detection events originating from single photon pulses and
H2 (·) is the binary entropy fraction
H2(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) (2.12)
2.2 The decoy state QKD
To defend against the PNS attack, Hwang introduced [34] the innovative idea that Alice
shuffles within her signal pulses, decoy pulses of different intensities. The decoy state method
[35, 36, 37] effectively counters the PNS attack, while providing a practical method to tightly
bound the estimation on the gain of single photon pulses Q1 and the error rate e1 for single
photon pulses. Since Eve’s measurement can only reveal the number of photons in the pulse
but she cannot know whether the pulse is a signal or a decoy, any attack that changes the
channel’s expected statistics, will be detected. For a state of photon number µ, we can
expand the gain Qµ and QBER QµEµ in terms of the yields of each number state Yn and



























By introducing infinite number of decoys, we get an equation for each decoyQν1 , Qν2 , . . . , Qνn ,











































Similar for the bit errors, QµEµ, Eν1Qν1 , Eν2Qν2 , . . . , EνnQνn . In principle the set of
infinite equations (2.15) can give the exact values of Yn and enYn for every n since
the {Qµ, Qν1 , . . . , Qνn} and {EµQµ, Eν1Qν1 , . . . , EνnQνn} can be directly measured in the
experiment. The secure key rate for a decoy-state QKD protocol is now [35]
Rdecoy−GLLP ≥ Q1 [1−H2 (e1)]−Qµ · f (Eµ) ·H2 (Eµ) (2.16)
with Q1 = Y1µe
−µ. Compared to the RGLLP rate of (2.11), the decoy state rate (2.16) offers
more than two order of magnitude improvement[35] for typical experimental parameters. In
practice since we use decoys with photon number ν  1, the higher order terms of eq.(2.15)
quickly become insignificant and just two decoy states [37] are enough to give tight bounds
on Q1 and e1. Indeed for a signal state of photon number µ and two decoy states of photon








































The goal is to find tight bounds on the yields Y0 and Y1. Combining eq.(2.18) and eq.(2.19)
to eliminate the Y1 term we have
ν1Qν2e








+ . . .
)
(2.20)










Similarly, combining again eq.(2.18) and eq.(2.19) to eliminate the Y0 term we have
Qν1e









the summation series in eq.(2.22) are comparable with the Y1 term and cannot be discarded,























describes the multi-photon contributions and can expressed as the







µ − Y0 − Y1µ (2.24)
Putting eq.(2.22), eq.(2.23), eq.(2.24) together, the single photon yield is lower bounded as
Y1 ≥
µ










In a similar fashion expanding the QBER associated with the decoys ν1 and ν2
Eν1Qν1e



















(ν1 − ν2)Y L1
(2.28)
Active phase randomization and the decoy-state method have been a standard in modern
QKD applications and are implemented on our study of the BB84 protocol in a turbulent
channel in Chapter 3.
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2.3 Attacks on detector side imperfections
A QKD protocol requires a detection setup, typically realized with a set of Single Photon
Avalanche Detectors. These devices employ a p − n junction diode, reversed biased well
above it’s breakdown voltage. At this point the arrival of even a single photon, at the
appropriate wavelength, can trigger a self sustaining avalanche of photoelectrons which is
registered as an electronic pulse. After a successful detection event, the detector blanks its
active detection region for a time interval called the dead-time, typically a few µs, to allow
any active carriers to discharge and so minimine unwanted false events called afterpulses.
The intricate operation of such detectors allow side channel attacks and multiple research
groups have demonstrated the feasibility of such attacks on existing QKD systems even with
existing technology.
The Time shift attack [38, 39] targets systems that employ gated single photon detectors.
The efficiency of these detectors is time dependent, exhibiting a finite response time and
steady detection plateau. Alice and Bob calibrate their systems so the signals arrive at the
center of the detection plateau for each detector but the efficiency profiles may not completely
overlap in time, Figure 2.1. Eve ,who can in principle control the channel, can exploit this
mismatch by introducing delays that shift the pulse randomly between positions t0 and t1
causing an asymmetry in the detection efficiency between the two detectors. The attack
allows Eve to know the recorded bit with probability depending on the efficiency mismatch
and since it does not require interception of Alice’s state, no errors are introduced making
it harder for Alice and Bob to detect the eavesdropping. Eve also can hide the efficiency
decrease caused by her attack, since she can control in principle the channel loss either
in the calibration phase or in the actual communication phase. The attack was launched
successfully on the commercially available QKD system, ID-500 from ID Quantique [39].
The Phase remapping attack [40, 41] targets QKD systems where the bit is encoded as the
relative phase between consecutive pulses by exploiting imperfections on the phase modulator
used for the encoding. Eve intercepts Bob’s reference pulse and sends to Alice signal pulses,
carefully delayed so it arrives on the rising or falling edge of the modulating signal Figure
2.1 used by Alice to apply the phase difference. Even if the rising edge is comparable
with the pulse width, Eve can still manipulate the polarization of the pulse and exploit
the asymmetry of the modulation depth for orthogonal polarizations. The feasibility of the
attack was demonstrated against a commercial QKD system, ID-500 from ID Quantique [41].












Figure 2.1: (a) Time shift attack. (b) Phase remapping attack.
Lyderesen et al. [43] used strong pulses to blind [44] Bob’s single photon avalanche
detectors at will. A blinded detector no longer behaves as a single photon detector but
rather as a classical photo-diode, where the generated photo-current is linearly proportional
to the input light power. If Eve sends bright pulses above a certain power threshold she can
force a detection event that mimics the detections of legitimate single photons, completely
manipulating the key generation. To execute the attack, Eve intercepts Alice’s pulses and
measures them, as Bob would. Then she sends strong pulses to Bob according to her
measurement result targeting the linear mode of Bob’s detectors. Eve calibrates the pulse
power in way that Bob’s detector clicks only when Eve and Bob use the same basis and
finally listens to the public discussion and performs the same error correction and privacy
amplification as Alice and Bob. The group demonstrated the feasibility of the attack on the
commercial QKD systems Clavis2 from ID Quantique and QPN 5505 from MagiQ. Gerhart
et al. [45] launched the intercept and resend tailored light attack on a fully functional
experimental QKD setup and completely intercepted the shared key. Wiechers et al. [46]
launched a similar intercept and resend attack on the Clavis2 commercial QKD system from
ID Quantique. The system has a loophole where it accepts strong pulses sent few ns before
or after the gate as legitimate signals, while the detector is in linear mode. This attack
increases the QBER due to increased afterpulses, but Eve can exploit an additional loophole
in the system since it registers the strong pulses even during the dead-time phase, allowing
her to extend the dead-time phase at will and so register fake signals without increasing the
QBER due to afterpulses. Possible countermeasures could involve a careful time resolving
to check whether the detection occurred in or outside the gate, a watchdog detector to check
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the intensity of the incoming pulses, or by randomly removing gates and check if detections
are still registered.
Ref.[47] demonstrates a simple but effective attack that exploits the dead-time setting on
Single Photon Avalance detectors working in Free Running mode. For her attack, Eve sends
a blinding pulse with effective photon number ηµ ∼ 10 photons at one of the four BB84 states
{H,V,D,A}. Eve’s pulse arrives a little before Alice’s pulse, and blinds three detectors with
high probability. For example if Eve sends an H blinding pulse, the H,D and A detectors are
blinded, each with certain probability. Thus she gains knowledge on Bob’s detection bit since
probably it was acquired by the detector orthogonal to her state. A simple countermeasure
would be to accept events only when all detectors are active.
2.4 Device Independent QKD
In the Device-Independent QKD [48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53], an EPR source in the middle creates
pairs of entangled qubits. Alice and Bob, each receive a qubit and perform a measurement
just as the original Ekert91-EPR protocol. This time we assume that all the devices, Alice
and Bob use to implement the protocol, including measurement and source preparation,
can be in Eve’s control. In fact the apparatuses can be seen as collective black boxes
that accept some classical inputs and return classical outputs, while the source they are
being distributed may belong to a Hilbert space that is a subset of the Hilbert space that
Eve controls. Alice and Bob though can still use the classical outputs and calculate the
CHSH polynomial, and because of the monogamous nature of the entanglement, as soon
as they establish that the Bell inequalities are violated, they can bound Eve’s information.
In a particular implementation, Alice performs the measurements A0, A1, A2 with outcomes
{a0, a1, a2} and Bob B1, B2 with outcomes {b1, b2}, just as in Ekert91 [23]. The raw key is
extracted from the measurements of A0 and B1 while the QBER is Q = Prob (a0 6= b1 | 01).







Alice and bob use a subset of their data to compute the CHSH polynomial [19]
S = 〈a1b1〉+ 〈a1b2〉+ 〈a2b1〉 − 〈a2b2〉 (2.29)
where the correlator 〈aibj〉 = Prob (a = b | ij) − Prob (a 6= b | ij). Then they can upper
bound the information Eve has on their shared key as











which is independent of Q, with h(·) the binary entropy function. They can extract a
secure key at rate
R ≥ 1− h (Q)− χ (B1 : E) (2.31)
As the violation of the Bell inequalities is the cornerstone of the DI-QKD, failure
to produce genuine violation could compromise the protocol’s security. Two important
loopholes in Bell experiments can impact DIQKD protocos. First the locality loophole
which requires the communicating parties to be space-like separated as otherwise a classical
protocol can reproduce any observed correlations. The second and more difficult to mitigate,
is the detection loophole [54], where if the detection efficiency is below a certain value, a local
model can exploit not-detected events and reproduce non-local correlations. The detection
loophole severely restricts the efficiency of the DIQKD as it requires very high detection
setups with efficiencies η > 82.8% for testing the CHSH inequality [49].
2.5 Measurement-Device-Independent QKD
Realistic implementations of QKD protocols introduce back-doors that can be exploited
by an eavesdropper. One solution could be to fully characterize the flaws of the devices.
But this is highly impractical and can prove dangerous since unexpected attacks are the
most threatening. The Device-Independent QKD protocol discussed in section 2.4, based
on the entanglement monogamy, removes in principle all possible device loopholes, but in
practice it is difficult to realize since it requires near perfect efficiency detectors. The time
reversed EPR protocol [26] discussed in subsection 1.5.5 assumes a completely untrusted
detection center. The authors revolve the discussion around the spin singlet state since
it can be discriminated but also mention that the protocol could be implemented with a
general Bell state discriminator. Furthermore, Inamori in his security proof [27] mentions
the use of polarized photon states for this purpose. Few years later Bell state discrimination
was proposed using linear optics [55, 56]. While linear optics utilize weak coherent pulses
which can introduce vulnerabilities and exploits as discussed in subsection 2.2, active phase
randomization and the decoy state method can protect against possible source attacks
without compromising the protocol’s efficiency. Putting everything together, Lo , Curty and
Qi proposed the protocol Measurement-Device-Independent (MDI) QKD [57] that removes
all possible loopholes that flaws in the detection setup may introduce, under the assumption
that Alice and Bob can perfectly prepare their states.
The principle of the protocol is presented in the schematic of Figure 2.2. Alice and




















Figure 2.2: MDI-QKD schematic. Alice and Bob prepare independently phase randomized
weak coherent (WC) pulses. In their respective lab they encode their bits as polarization
states and modulate the pulse intensities to implement the decoy state method. Then they
send their states to a middleman , Charlie who performs a Bell state projection measurement
and announces the results.
as attenuated laser pulses. They encode their bits as polarization in the four BB84 states
: Horizontal, Vertical, Diagonal, Anti-diagonal (|H〉 , |V 〉 , |D〉 , |A〉). They implement the
decoy state method by modulating the pulse intensities. Then they send their states to
a middleman Charlie ,who may even be untrusted, to perform a Bell state projection
and announce the results. Charlie’s setup consists of a 50 : 50 Beam Splitter where the
incoming states undergo Hong-Ou-Mandel (H.O.M.) interference [58]. Each output of the
Beam Splitter is directed to a Polarization Beam Splitter (PBS) and a pair of Single Photon
Avalance Detectors (SPAD) to measure the Polarization state (Horizontal or Vertical).
Depending on the result announced, Alice and Bob can correlate the bits they have in
their possession. Specifically, with the indices 1&2 in Figure 2.2 denoting the output ports
of the beam splitter, the Bell state projection is understood as follows ,
• Coinciding detections on opposite beam splitter (BS) ports:
(D1V and D2H) or (D2V and D1H) correspond to a projection on the |Ψ−〉 =
1√
2
[|HV 〉 − |V H〉] state.
• Coinciding detections from the same beam splitter (BS) port :
(D1V and D1H) or (D2V and D2H) correspond to the |Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
[|HV 〉+ |V H〉]
state.
The above projection can be understood as a two photon state is a symmetric state since
photons are bosons, particles with integer spin, and can be written as the product of their
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spatial and polarization sate,
|ψ〉 = |ψ〉spatial  |ψ〉poalrization (2.32)
When the photons exit on opposite ports, the spatial state is necessarily anti-symmetric,
so their polarization state has to be anti-symmetric as well, with the state |Ψ−〉 being
the only possibility. Similarly, exit at the same port corresponds to a symmetric spatial
state and therefore a symmetric |Ψ+〉 polarization state. Noting that the Bell states
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|HH〉 ± |V V 〉] cannot be utilized since they require the photons to land on
the same detector, but typical single photon detectors cannot resolve multiple incoming
photons. Depending on the announcement made by Charlie , Alice and Bob can determine
how their bits are correlated during the public basis comparison. If they both used the
rectilinear basis and Charlie announces either |Ψ+〉 or |Ψ−〉, one has to perform a bit flip
during post-processing. If they both used the diagonal then if the relay projects on to the
|Ψ−〉 again one has to perform flip but if the relay outputs |Ψ+〉 no bit flip is required, as
summarized in Table 2.1.
The correlations presented in Table 2.1 can easily be shown. For example if we assume
that both Alice and Bob use the diagonal basis and the choose the same bit ↗ then if the
Bell state projection is successful, it can only be the |Ψ+〉. For the schematic of Fig.(2.2)
assume that Alice and Bob send single photons a†↗b
†
↗ |0〉 as input to the beam splitter and









with c†k |0〉 and d†k |0〉 being the creation operators for the polarization k on the c and d
































Table 2.1: Bits sent by Alice , encoded as polarization states on randomly selected bases.
Basis used by both Alice and Bob Charlie announces |Ψ−〉 Charlie announces |Ψ+〉
Rectilinear Bit flip is required Bit flip is required
Diagonal Bit flip is required No bit flip required
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The valid events c†Hc
†
V |0〉 and d†Hd†V |0〉 are equivalent to a |Ψ+〉 projection. Alice and Bob
have the same bit |↗〉 in possession and no bit flip is required, in accordance with Table 2.1.








−Qrectf (Erect)H (Erect) (2.35)
with Q1,1rect the single photon gain, i.e. the gain when Alice and Bob both sent single photon
pulses in the rectilinear basis and e1,1diag the error associated with single photon pulses in the
diagonal basis. These two parameters are estimated with the decoy state method. Also Qrect
and Erect are the gain and Quantum Bit Error rate for the rectilinear basis and are directly
determined experimentally.
MDI-QKD is ideal for applications involving remote and mobile communicating parties
that cannot utilize fiber networks, such as ships and planes. The measurement center could be
a satellite or a foreign agency who may not be trusted. In this scenario, as the communication
takes place over free space channel, atmospheric turbulence has a significant impact in the
degradation of the secure key generation rate as is responsible for the loss of transmitted
photons. The implementation of selection methods that reject or discard recorded bits,
depending on the transmittance they experience, significantly improves the signal-to-noise
ratio and pairing with the MDI-QKD offer a secure and efficient communication scheme over
free-space turbulent channels. The following chapters examine the main components of this
scheme: the application of the selections methods over turbulent channel for the simpler
BB84 protocol and the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference which is at the heart of MDI-QKD
and characterizes its efficiency.
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Chapter 3
Experimental decoy state BB84




As Quantum communication grows beyond proof-of-principle in lab experiments towards
large scale commercial deployment in the near future a lot of attention is on the optical
medium such networks will be realized on. Fiber optical networks are possible at
metropolitan scales [59, 60] but are limited in distance due to transmission losses, typically
0.18 dB/km at a 1550nm wavelength [61]. While classical optical signals travelling in fiber,
can be enhanced by intermediate amplifiers and reach far larger distances, such techniques
cannot be employed for Quantum Communication schemes due to the no-cloning theorem
[62]. Quantum Repeaters [63] appear as a possible solution but still a lot of progress needs
to be made before they become available for practical Quantum Communication. Free-
space channels offer an attractive alternative for intermediate distances for mobile or remote
communicating parties or as part of a ground-to-satellite network. So far experimental
demonstrations in free-space include ground to plane [64], to hot air balloon [65] and to
drones [66]. Signals travelling in free-space experience losses due to the divergence of the
beam diameter, absorption and scattering, and the atmospheric turbulence. The beam
divergence can be accommodated by increasing the size of the receiving lenses and absorption
and scattering cause a consistent degradation of the signal intensity. On the other hand
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turbulence is associated with fluctuations in the temperature , pressure and humidity of
the air which result in random variations in the atmospheric refractive index [67]. The
description of light propagation in a turbulent medium is a very difficult problem but the
channel can be described statistically and is accepted that the transmission coefficient can be
approached by a log-normal probability distribution [68, 69, 70]. Free-space implementations
so far treat the effect of the turbulence as an average loss and do not consider the particular
distribution of the transmittance coefficient.
Taking the channel statistics into account, various selection methods have been recently
proposed that reject or discard recorded bits if they experience low channel transmittance,
aiming to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Evren et al. [71] developed a signal-
to-noise ratio filter (SNRF) where the quantum data are grouped into bins during post-
processing. Any bins containing a detection rate below a certain threshold are discarded.
The algorithm searches for the optimal bin-size and optimal detection rate per bin threshold
that maximizes the extracted secret key rate. Vallone et al. [72] employed a secondary
classical laser beam to probe the channel statistics. They observed a good correlation between
the classical and quantum detection data and developed the Adaptive Real-Time Selection
method (ARTS) to adaptively select high transmittance bits and therefore decrease in post-
processing the Quantum Bit Error rate (QBER), improving the extracted secure key rate.
Wang et al. [73] proposed the Prefixed-Real Time Selection (P-RTS) method and show
that the optimal selection threshold is independent of the channel statistics and depends
mainly on the receiver’s detection setup characteristics i.e. the detection efficiency and
background noise and secondarily to the intensity of the quantum signals. Thus the selection
cutoff can be predetermined and the rejection can be accomplished in real time without the
need to store unnecessary bits or perform extra post-processing. While the authors of [73]
demonstrated the P-RTS method in single photon and decoy-state BB84 QKD, including
finite-size effects, the method is general and can be applied in other Quantum Communication
protocols. Indeed a recent study [74] applies the selection method to the Measurement-
Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) protocol [57].
In this study the selection method is employed experimentally on the finite-size decoy
state BB84 [14] QKD protocol. The random transmittance fluctuations caused by the
atmospheric turbulence are simulated using an Intensity Modulator. Performing the
experiments in a laboratory environment allows the study of different atmospheric conditions
in a controllable and predictable manner. Noting also a recent study where the effects of
turbulence on the optical wave-front are also simulated. [75].
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3.2 Key generation in a turbulent channel
By keeping all the experimental parameters fixed, i.e. Bob’s detection parameters: his
detector’s efficiencies, background noise and optical misalignment as well as Alice’s quantum
state parameters, we can write the key rate as a single function of the transmittance R (η).
The maximum information we can extract by the channel’s statistics is by convoluting the




R (η) p (η) dη (3.1)
On the other hand such an integration is not possible in practical applications. What we




p (η) dη of the sent signals and then treat the remaining recordings as they
have passed through a static channel of average transmittance 〈η〉 which is computed only








Thus the rate we can calculate is:
R (ηT ) = R (〈η〉)×
∫ 1
ηT
p (η) dη (3.3)
The authors of [73] show that the rate (3.3) we can calculate can approach very well the
ideal rate of eq.(3.1) by making two key observations. First there exists a critical ηCR that




R (η) p (η) dη =
∫ 1
ηCR
R (η) p (η) dη (3.4)
Secondly the rate R (η) although convex in general, approaches linearity very well as shown
in Figure 3.1 for the asymptotic Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill Rate (GLLP) [28].
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Figure 3.1: Reproduction from [73]. The RGLLP rate approaches linearity very well.
Approaching the rate R (η) as linear R (η) ≈ α · η + β we have,∫ 1
ηCR
R (η) pη0,σ (η) dη ≈
∫ 1
ηCR




α · ηpη0,σ (η) dη +
∫ 1
ηCR




pη0,σ (η) dη (3.7)
In eq.(3.6) the average 〈η〉 is calculated in the [ηCR, 1] region using the truncated distribution
according to eq.(3.2). Finally we note that ηCR is the optimal choice for the threshold since
both factors of eq.(3.7) decrease monotonically for η > ηCR. In conclusion, the simple rate
of eq.(3.3) is a very good approximation of the maximum rate eq.(3.1) if we choose the
threshold to be equal with the the critical transmission ηCR.
If we take into account the divergence of linearity, the optimum threshold does not
coincide with ηCR any more. As a result the approximation of eq.(3.7) is slightly below the
maximum rate form eq.(3.4) .
When we consider the finite-size effects the parameters needed for the secure key rate
calculation depend on the number of pulses N sent by Alice. Discarding low transmittance
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events affects the available pulses, so we need to modify N → N ×
∫ 1
ηT
p (η) dη and the
distilled secure key rate is modified as:
R = RFinite−size
(








p (η) dη (3.8)
The estimation of the secure key rate utilizes the decoy-state QKD with finite size effects
model from Lim et al. [76].
3.3 Experimental setup
In Figure 3.2 the experimental setup is presented. A continuous-wave (CW) laser source
(Wavelength References) at 1550.5nm , in-between the ITU channels 33 and 34, is used to
encode our quantum states on. The light is directed to a Phase Modulator (EOSPACE)
that performs phase randomization and subsequently to a LiNbO3 (EOSPACE) Intensity
Modulator to carve out pulses of FWHM ∼ 1.5ns at 25MHz repetition rate. The DC bias
Voltage of the Intensity modulator is automatically adjusted by a Null Point Controller
(PlugTech) to achieve optimal extinction ratio (typically ∼ 1 · 10−3). This modulator also
implements the decoy-state method as it is driven by an Arbitrary Waveform generator
where the amplitudes of the pulses are created according to the desired decoy intensities
and frequencies. The polarization state is encoded by a homemade high-speed polarization
modulation setup which shown in the schematic of Figure 3.3. This set-up is described in
reference [77] and was proposed in [78].
The pulses are attenuated by a combination of digital and analog variable attenuators
down to single photon levels. The quantum states are multiplexed with classical laser
pulses that are used to probe the channel’s transmittance statistics and both are directed
to an Acousto-Optic Modulator (Brimrose) that is simulating the turbulent channel. Bob’s
selection setup consists of a De-multiplexer (Lightel) that separates the classical laser probing
the intensity fluctuations and the quantum laser in which Alice’s state is encoded. The
classical laser is collected by a high gain detector (Thorlabs) and an oscilloscope (Tektronix)
stores the data for the fluctuations. The quantum signal is directed to an additional
De-multiplexer to enhance the isolation between classical & quantum signal. In overall
combining time multiplexing with isolation ∼ 10−3 and frequency multiplexing with isolation
∼ 10−4×10−4 we achieve a crosstalk between classical and quantum lasers ∼ 10−11. A 50 : 50
Beam Splitter passively selects Bob’s detection basis, rectilinear or diagonal. Each basis is
realized by a Polarization Beam Splitter and a pair of InGaAs Single Photon Avalance
























Figure 3.2: Schematic of the experimental setup. DWDM: Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexer, IM: Intensity Modulator,
Pol-M: Polarization Modulator setup depicted in Figure(3.3), ATT: Variable Attenuator, AOM: Acousto-Optic Modulator,
BS: 50:50 Beam Splitter, PBS: Polarization Beam Splitter, {H,V,D,A} SPAD: Single Photon Avalanche Detectors, TIA: Time
Interval Analyzer. Blue connecting lines represent fibers that transmit the quantum signals , Red fibers that transmit the






Figure 3.3: Schematic of the Polarization Modulation setup. PC: single paddle Polarization
Controller, CIRC: Circulator, PM: Phase Modulator, FM: Faraday Mirror.
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Figure 3.4: Fits to extract the background noise parameters for each detector. On the
vertical axis the detection probaility.
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Table 3.1: Dark Count probability per gate of each Single Photon Avalance Detector of
Figure 3.2
H V D A
Pdc 8 · 10−6 2.9 · 10−5 6.8 · 10−5 7.0 · 10−5
b 2.8 · 10−4 1.9 · 10−4 5.0 · 10−4 9 · 10−5
Table 3.2: Detection Setup parameters
Bob’s optical transmittance Bob’s detector efficiency optical misalignment
0.42 10% 3 · 10−3
Dead-time Gating Frequency Gate Width
9µs 25MHz 5ns
The dead-time was set to 9µs to reduce the afterpulse probability. Since the afterpulse
probability depends on the light intensity received by the detectors, we observe a linear
dependence of the background probability Pbg in terms of the transmittance η of the form
Pbg(η) = Pdc + b · η. The parameters Pdc and b are extracted experimentally with the
linear fits shown in Figure 3.4 from test measurements and are displayed in Table 3.1. The
optical misalignment is approximately 3 · 10−3. The Single photon detectors were set to 10%
quantum efficiency. Bob’s detection system parameters are summarized in Table 3.2. Bob’s
optical transmittance refers to the instruments in Bob’s setup i.e. the Beam Splitter, the
Polarization Beam Splitters and any fiber links.
3.4 All-fiber turbulence simulator
Given the turbulence parameters (η0, σ) we sample the set of transmittances from the













with η the channel transmittance and η0 , σ the mean and variance of the distribution.
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Vπ=  1.48 Volt
Figure 3.5: Fit to determine the modulator’s Vπ
With Iin the intensity input to the Acousto-Optical Modulator and Iout the output











where V SQ is the amplitude of the applied modulating square pulse, and Vπ is a fixed
parameter describing the Voltage required to introduce a π phase difference between the two
arms of the modulator. The value of Vπ is determined by scanning the transmittances for
different amplitudes in Figure 3.5 and then fitting eq.(3.10) to the data. The fit returns
Vπ = 1.48V olt.
Reversing eq.(3.10) we acquire V SQ as a function of the transmittance V SQ (η) with which




cos−1 (2η − 1) (3.11)
3.5 Experimental procedure
We calibrate the polarization basis using the alignment Polarization Controllers in Figure
3.2. We calibrate the decoy intensities using a classical detection setup to monitor the
intensities and applying the appropriate attenuation. We fine-tune the optical efficiency by
slightly adjusting the pulse position within the detector’s gate. For each measurement we
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send N = 4 · 1010 pulses which at frequency 25MHz require 26.7 minutes of runtime. The
detection data are recorded by the Time Interval Analyser along with the SYNC signals of
the decoy, polarization and turbulence sequences and a custom made program sifts them
to collect the sets nXk,mXk, nZk,mZk for k ∈ (µs, µw, µv), that are needed for the secure
key distillation parameters according to the model of [76]. In the previous nBk is the set of
detections where both Alice and Bob use the basis B and the decoy intensity k is used and
mBk the detections in error for the basis B and decoy k. In particular these sets produce
the zero and single photon pulses contribution sX,0 and sX,1 the phase error φX and the












with fEC = 1.16 the efficiency of the classical error correction algorithm [15], εsec = 10
−10
the secrecy parameter and εcor = 10
−15 the correctness parameter. Using the previously
presented experimental parameters we run an optimization algorithm to find the optimal
parameters {qX , Pµs , Pµw , µs, µw} and program our polarization and decoy waveforms. In
the previous qX is the proportion of the rectilinear basis, Pµs and Pµw the proportions of
the signal and weak decoy and µs, µw the signal and weak decoy intensities, for the desired
Turbulence parameters {η0, σ}. The details of the optimization routine are presented in
Appendix B
In Figure 3.6 we present our measurement results of the error in the rectilinear basis by
applying increasing transmittance thresholds, for moderate Turbulence parameters {η0 =
10−1.7, σ = 0.9} and {qX = 0.770, Pµs = 0.548, Pµw = 0.288, µs = 0.527, µw = 0.241}
In Figure 3.7 we present the secure key rate for different choices of transmittance cutoffs
for 17db channel loss and σ = 0.9.
We must note that to calculate the secure key rate we need the exact number of photons
per pulse for each decoy. We observed fluctuations . 0.01 for our signal and weak decoy
states but these fluctuations are not taken into account in this study. Moreover there is an
additional uncertainty in the weak decoy intensity at ∼ 0.01 due to the uncertainty in the
choice of the Voltage amplitude that drives the Intensity Modulator that carves the decoy
pulses. Any future studies and implementations should include uncertainties and fluctuations
of the intensities. A model for finite-size decoy-state QKD with fluctuating intensities can
be found in Mizutani et al.[79].
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Figure 3.6: Error rate in the rectilinear basis while applying increasing transmittance
cutoffs. The solid lines represent a ±5% uncertainty in Bob’s detection efficiency and
misalignment and background noise.



















Figure 3.7: Secure Key rate at 17db loss, while applying increasing transmittance cutoffs.




In Figures 3.6 and 3.7 the benefit from applying the Selection method is clearly demonstrated.
In Figure 3.6 we observe a significant reduction of the error rate among the post-selected
recordings and most importantly, Figure 3.7 shows that the error decrease translates into a
significant increase of the secure key generation. It is important to emphasize that without
the Selection method, the key generation for the Turbulence conditions of Figure 3.7 is zero,
thus creating “something out of nothing” as stated in [73]. At the optimal threshold, which
according to the P-RTS method can be predetermined we generate 10−5.3 bits per pulse, so
for this session a secure key of length 10−5.3 × 4 · 1010 = 200kbits was extracted.
The Selection method can be easily implemented without any significant technological
upgrades, on the contrary while saving computational resources. We observe that the
Selection method is especially beneficial for lower quality detection setups i.e. lower detection
efficiency and/or higher detection noise as the Turbulence impacts their Signal-to-Noise ratio
more severely. We note also that the application presented in Figure 3.7 is not even the
optimal. Typically Avalance detectors offer a variety of efficiency and dead-time settings.
As each setting significantly impacts the background noise profile of Figure 3.4, the choice of
the optimal settings becomes on its own an optimization problem. For example decreasing
the dead-time, increases the gates that are available to accept an event but also increases the
background noise due to afterpulses, so any benefit of decreasing the dead-time is quickly





distribution over turbulent channels;
Hong-Ou-Mandel interference
This chapter presents the study on the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference in realistic implemen-
tations published in [80].
4.1 Motivation, importance of HOM interferometers
The interference of two photons in a beam splitter was first examined by Hong, Ou and
Mandel [58]. As the input photons (Figure 4.1) become more and more indistinguishable in
all degrees of freedom, the coincidence rate of the beam splitter output photons exhibits a
characteristic dip, the depth of which depends on the degree of indistinguishability of the
input photons [81]. Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometers are valuable tools in many Quantum
Information and Quantum Optics applications that require photon indistinguishability. The
theoretical limit for the Hong-Ou-Mandel visibility is 0.5 for indistinguishable weak coherent
photon states, but several device imperfections may hinder the experimental implementation
to reach this value. In this work we examine how the interference visibility is affected by (i)
detector side imperfections due to after-pulses (ii) mismatches in the intensities and states
of polarization of the input signals and (iii) the overall intensity of the input signals.
A convenient alternative to PDC heralded photons is using weak coherent states [82],
implemented as attenuated laser light. Studies have been conducted to examine the HOM
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visibility using coherent states, including the effect of the laser frequency chirp and time
jitter [83, 84], the optical delay between the inputs and detection time differences [85] and
the frequency mismatch [86].
Since the HOM interference can be used in experimental Bell state analysis [55, 56], it
lies at the heart of Measurement Device Independent-QKD [57], discussed in section 2.5.
The applicability of the protocol has been demonstrated in multiple experiments [87, 60,
88, 89]. In MDI-QKD the interference visibility significantly affects the final key generation
rate [83, 89, 90]. Using coherent states instead of single photon states could open up a
potential vulnerability due to the non-zero probability of multiple photon pulses but the
implementation of the decoy state method [34, 29, 37] can overcome such a threat.
Wang, et al in [91] examine how realistic imperfections of the devices used in an
HOM interference experiment affect the Visibility. In particular they consider possible
imperfections on the beam splitter , mismatches in the input intensities and examine the
effect of the Afterpulses when using single photon avalanche detectors. In this work we
provide experimental measurements and extend the work to include possible mismatches in
the state of polarization of the inputs and to examine how the overall intensity of the inputs
affects the Visibility.
4.2 Parameterizing the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference
visibility
The set-up for our Hong-Ou-Mandel interference measurements consists of two independent
input laser pulses, interfering at a beam splitter (BS) and with each output directed to a










Figure 4.1: Schematic of the HOM set-up. Two weak coherent pulses enter the a and b ports
of the beam splitter and interfere. Each output port (c & d) is directed to a single-photon
avalanche InGaAs detector.
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We model the input to the beam-splitter state as two weak coherent states:




created by creation operators â† and b̂†, and of parameters α and β, respectively. The
coherent-state parameters are complex and include a phase, α =
√
µae




µa,b are the corresponding average photon numbers of the two beams. In our experimental























Nevertheless, we will continue to work with the state eq.((4.1)) and average over the phases
at the end.
To account for the action of the beam splitter, we introduce a pair of orthogonal
directions, named horizontal and vertical, respectively, and express the polarization vectors
of the incoming beams ε̂a,b in terms of unit vectors in the chosen directions, ε̂H,V . The
creation operators are similarly expressed as linear combinations:
â† = ε̂a ·ε̂H a†H + ε̂a ·ε̂V a†V
b̂† = ε̂b ·ε̂H b†H + ε̂b ·ε̂V b†V (4.3)
The action of a beam splitter with reflectivity R = r2 and transmissivity T = t2, with
R + T = 1, is described by the unitary transformation:
a†i → tc†i + rd†i
b†i → rc†i − td†i (4.4)
where c†i and d
†
i are the creation operators of the respective output beams, with i = H, V .

















Given this output state, the probability Pmn that m (n) photons emerge at output port c
(d) is found to be (refer to Appendix A for details)












2 + 2tr< (αβ∗ε̂a ·ε̂∗b)
µd = µar
2 + µbt
2 − 2tr< (αβ∗ε̂a ·ε̂∗b) (4.7)
Notice that the mean photon numbers of the beams obey the conservation law
µa + µb = µc + µd (4.8)
which is a consequence of the unitarity of the beam-splitter transformation eq.(4.4), R+T =
r2 + t2 = 1.
Our real detectors at the two beam-splitter ports have efficiencies ηc and ηd, and dark-





× (1− (1− ηC)m(1− dc))
× (1− (1− ηD)n(1− dd)) (4.9)





After averaging over the phases, we obtain the total coincidence probability corresponding
to the state of eq.(4.2) (details presented in Appendix A) in terms of Bessel functions:






+ CDI0(2(ηc − ηd)
√
µaµbtr cos Φ) (4.11)
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where
C = e−ηc(µat2+µbr2)(1− dc) ,
D = e−ηd(µar2+µbt2)(1− dd) , (4.12)
and Φ is a measure of the polarization mismatch between the two incoming beams defined
by
cos Φ = |ε̂a ·ε̂∗b | (4.13)
The total probability that the detector at port c clicks, after averaging over phases, is also
expressed similarly in terms of a Bessel function,
P (c) = 1− CI0(2ηc
√
µaµbtr cos Φ) (4.14)
The total probability that the detector at port d clicks is found similarly:
P (d) = 1−DI0(2ηd
√
µaµbtr cos Φ) (4.15)





Using the explicit expressions (4.11), (4.14), and (4.15), we find that VHOM ∈ [0, 0.5]. We
aim at maximizing the value of VHOM .
4.3 Experimental setup
Our experimental setup is shown on Figure 4.2. Two independent continuous wave (CW)
lasers (Wavelength References) at 1550 nm were employed to prepare weak coherent states.
The frequency difference between the two lasers stayed below 10 MHz without performing
any feedback control. Note, in all experiments, the phase difference between the two lasers
swept through a multi-2π range within the data acquisition time. This is equivalent to
the phase averaging process assumed in the theoretical analysis. To generate laser pulses,
two LiNbO3 intensity modulators were used to modulate the outputs of the two lasers. The
two intensity modulators were driven by the same digital delay generator (Stanford Research








CW Source CW Source
SPAD SPAD
TIA Computer
Figure 4.2: Schematic of the experimental setup.
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The polarization state of each pulse can be randomly changed with a home-made high-
speed polarization modulator, which is driven by a Keysight Waveform Generator (WG)
. Details about the polarization modulator can be found in [77]. Once the polarization
is applied to the pulse, it passes through a beam circulator and enters free space. Upon
returning to fiber, the pulses enter an additional polarization controller where HOM visibility
is fine-tuned prior to data collection. The pulse is then digitally attenuated in order to
reach the single-photon level to interfere at the beam splitter and be read by single-photon
avalanche detectors (SPAD). The detectors are both IdQuantique 210 with one being an
ultra-low noise model run in gated mode. Timestamps of detection events are recorded on a
time-interval analyzer (TIA) with a resolution of 80.9576 ps.
4.4 Results
Here we report on our experimental results. We examine how the HOM Visibility is affected
by the after-pulse effect and by various imperfections in the source preparation.
HOM visibility and detector imperfections
We consider the effect on HOM visibility due to detector imperfections. Ref. [91] highlights
the after-pulse effect as a significant source of error in an experimental implementation of
the HOM interference. The authors of [91] employed a non-Markovian model and showed
that the coincidence probability, after considering the after-pulse effect, can be written as:
P (coin;aft) = P (coin) +
[






P (d) − P (coin)
]
P (c)P (total;aft)c (4.17)
where P (coin) is the coincidence probability given by eq.(4.17), and P (c), P (d) are the detection





d , describe the total after-pulse probability for each
detector. We assume that the after-pulse probability decays with time as a simple exponential
P (t) = P0 · e−t/τ , with P0 the initial after-pulse probability and τ the characteristic decay
time. In gated mode the total after-pulse probability, receives contributions only when the
gate is open:





with Tdt the detector dead time and Tgat the gating period. Probabilities P
(c) and P (d) of
eq.(4.14) and eq.(4.15) are similarly modified as,
P (c,aft) = P (c)
[
1 + (1− P (c))P (total;aft)c
]
(4.19)
P (d,aft) = P (d)
[
1 + (1− P (d))P (total;aft)d
]
(4.20)
With eq.(4.18) we can relate the HOM visibility with the dead time settings on our
detectors. First, we need to determine the parameters P0 and experimentally. We follow
the procedure described in [92] and collect histograms of detection events binned into time
intervals between successive detection events. By fitting the logarithm of the frequencies
with equation (6) in [92] we extract the parameters P0 and τ experimentally. For our first
run the gating and pulse frequency was set to 2MHz. The detection histograms presented
in Figure 4.3 gave the values PC0 = 0.018 and τC = 0.85µs for detector C, and P
D
0 = 0.033























Figure 4.3: Histograms of the detection probability. The fits are used to extract the total
afterpulse Probability for each detector.
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Figure 4.4: HOM Visibility vs the applied Dead-time
A measurement of the HOM Visibility was then performed. The pulse width was set to
2 ns and the gate width at nominal width of 7 ns. Each of these widths can be changed
by about 10% without appreciable change in the reported results. The dark counts were
recorded for the two detectors at 10−4 and 4 × 10−5 per gate, respectively while the dead
time was set to 0.1µs. Increasing the dead time further decreased the dark counts. In
Fig. 4.4, the measurement results are presented in comparison to our model showing good
agreement.
Source effects on HOM visibility
By lowering the total input intensity, the HOM visibility is improved. However, reaching
very low intensities may render the experiment vulnerable to dark counts, and increases the
required time to perform a measurement. This in turn renders the experiment vulnerable
to various drifts (e.g., the drift in the state of polarization, or in the DC offset of the
modulators). We examined the effect of the overall input intensity on the HOM visibility.
Setting the intensities of the input beams equal, µa = µb = µ in eq.(4.10), eq.(4.14), and
eq.(4.15), we studied the dependence of the HOM visibility on the average input photon
number µ. Theoretically, the HOM visibility approaches the limit value 0 at large input
intensities, whereas it approaches the maximum value 0.5 at weak intensities.
In our measurements, we used 2−ns width pulses. Our detectors were running in external
gating mode at 1−MHz trigger frequency with an effective gate width of approximately 3ns
(nominal gate width set to 7ns) and 10% efficiency. The dark counts of the two detectors were
recorded approximately as 2.5× 10−5 and 1.5× 10−5 per gate, respectively. The dead time
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Figure 4.5: H.O.M. Visibility vs the effective photon number each pulse contains.
on the detectors was set to 7µs (a longer dead time does not change the results appreciably).
To make sure that the beam-splitter inputs were equal, the free-space path of one arm was
blocked, and the intensity of the unblocked armed was digitally attenuated until the detection
rate reached the desired value. The average photon-number input to the beam splitter is










where η is the detector efficiency, Rdet is the detector rate of each unblocked input, Tdt
is the dead time, and Tgat is the gating period. The factor of 2 in eq.(4.21) accommodates
the intensity splitting at the 50 : 50 beam splitter. In Fig. 4.5, the measurement results of
the HOM visibility as a function of the input photon number are presented and compared
with the theoretical model (calculated using eq.(4.10), (4.14), and (4.15)), showing good
agreement between theory and experiment.
Next, we consider the effect of imperfections in input state preparationon the HOM
visibility.
In a realistic experimental setup, two independent laser beams are independently
attenuated. In practice, perfect intensity balance may be not possible. Using eq.(4.10),
(4.14), and (4.15), we can model the HOM visibility theoretically as a function of the ratio
of the input photon numbers µa/µb.
For our measurements, the dead time for each detector was set to 7µs with efficiency 10%.
Each free-space arm was blocked for either Alice/Bob between data points to record detector
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Figure 4.6: H.O.M. vs the Intensity Mismatch between the incoming pulses.
count-rates. The count rates were controlled via digital attenuation and set to desired values
to within 2%. From the detector count-rates and using formula (4.21), the photon number
can be extracted for each count-rate. In this measurement the photon number for the input
arm at port α was fixed at µa = 0.47, while varying the attenuation on the input at port
digitally. We sent weak coherent pulses at 1 MHz with pulse widths of 2ns through the beam
splitter and to our detectors. Each detector’s gate width was approximately 7ns to mitigate
the detection of background source photons outside the intended pulse width. In Fig. 4.6,
the measurement results of the HOM visibility as a function of the ratio of input photon
numbers are plotted with the theoretical model (eq.(4.10), (4.14), and (4.15)), showing good
agreement.
Next, we consider the effect of the polarization misalignment of the incoming beams on
the HOM visibility. Equations (4.10), (4.14), and (4.15) show the dependence of the HOM
visibility on the polarization misalignment Φ in eq.(4.13). Assuming that the bases of the
two inputs are perfectly aligned, we can write the polarization vectors ε̂a and ε̂b in terms of
the transverse-electric (TE) and transverse-magnetic (TM) modes of the phase modulator’s
waveguide as:
ε̂a = cosφa |TE〉+ sinφaeıφ0 |TM〉




π is the modulation phase caused by the driving generator, Vg is the voltage
applied by the generator, and Vπ is the constant voltage that causes a π phase shift. Using a
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Figure 4.7: H.O.M. Visibility vs the mismatch in the Polarization of the icoming pulses.
manual polarization controller we carefully arrange the input to the waveguide to be at 45◦
with respect to the waveguide’s axis, so cosφa = cosφb =
1√
2
. The polarization misalignment
angle Φ eq. (4.13) can then be related to the applied voltage as:




For our measurements, we controlled the state of polarization using the Polarization
Modulation set-up described in [78]. We used a Keysight waveform generator to drive an
EOSpace Phase Modulator. The Vπ voltage of the phase modulator was determined to be
5.25 V. Pulses of width 2.1ns and average photon number µ = 0.45 ± 0.05 interfered at
a 50 : 50 beam splitter. The outputs were directed to two SPADs operated at free-gated
mode at ∼ 10% efficiency with gate period 1 µs, dead time set at 7.5 µs, and gate width
of 6.5ns. The dark counts were recorded approximately 5.5× 10−5 and 2.0× 10−5 per gate,
respectively. The coincidence window was set at 5ns. Plot in Fig. 4.7.
4.5 Discussion
In this work, we parametrized the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference visibility in terms of realistic
imperfections that may appear in experimental implementations using weak coherent states.
We examined the effect of mismatches in the state of polarization and intensities of the
inputs. We also considered imperfections on the detector side resulting from the detector’s
after pulses as well as the effect of the overall intensity of otherwise perfect sources. We
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conducted measurements that resulted in experimental data that agreed very well with our
theoretical models. In conclusion, good Hong-Ou-Mandel interference visibility is attainable
using standard commercially available optical components and single-photon detectors. We
conclude that the after-pulse effect can be effectively mitigated by applying a dead time
6 − 8µs , when the detectors are triggered at a few-MHz frequencies. Realistic intensity
imbalances were less than 10% and they have minimal impact on the measured HOM
visibility. For example, the HOM visibility is expected to be 0.489 for µa = µb = 0.45.
A realistic imbalance µa = 0.45 and µb = 0.50 would decrease the visibility to just 0.487.
Some extra care should be taken when adjusting the state of polarization for the two
arms. Assuming µa = µb = 0.45, while a 0
◦ misalignment gives a visibility of 0.489,
a 6◦ misalignment gives a visibility of 0.483. Given that manual polarization controllers
can achieve typical extinction ratios 20-30 dB [93], a misalignment of that order should be
expected. We identify the state of polarization misalignment as the major source of error
in the measurements we present in this work. We finally discussed how the HOM visibility
is affected by the overall input intensity aiming to achieve efficient intensities for practical
measurements while remaining in the quantum regime.
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Chapter 5
Future extensions of this work
5.1 P-RTS method for the MDI-QKD protocol
In Chapter 3 we successfully demonstrate the P-RTS method for the BB84 protocol, while
in Chapter 4 our extensive study on the H.O.M. interference reaffirms the applicability
of the MDI-QKD protocol in realistic implementations. An immediate extension is the
implementation of the selection method for the MDI-QKD protocol, which could be very
beneficial for remote communicating parties that need to securely communicate utilizing
untrusted relays such satellites. For realistic applications we need to assume finite resources
for the communicating parties and consider finite-size effects to the secure key distillation
[94]. Figure 5.1 depicts the schematic of a possible experimental demonstration.
5.2 Quantum position verification
The need to verify that an untrusted party (someone with no credentials), which can
be a potential communicating partner or a measurement relay, is indeed at a particular
geographical location can be included in general communication schemes. A successful
position verification can be included as a prerequisite to other cryptographic tasks such as
authentication and key distribution. A classical position verification scheme would require
the prover, the party whose position needs to be verified, to interactively communicate with
a set of a verifiers. As the verifiers can communicate privately among themselves the can
compare their results and pinpoint the position of the prover. In the quantum version of the
scheme [95], the verifiers send independently a quantum state and the classical information
about the appropriate measurement basis. Two colluding eavesdroppers could try to pose as
the legitimate prover, one intercepts the classical basis information and the other performs
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the quantum measurement. The verifiers can defend by designing the scheme in a way that
the eavesdropper intercepting the basis information cannot inform his partner in time to
perform his measurement. This defence can be demonstrated experimentally with a setup
similar to the our current BB84 experiment.
5.3 Reconfigurable QKD
Despite offering an exceptional balance between security and efficiency, MDI-QKD is surely
less efficient the BB84 QKD protocol since it requires coinciding detection events which scale
as the square of the detector’s efficiency. Furthermore for free space applications, turbulence
may hinder the synchronization of the arrival time of the independent pulses, further reducing
the efficiency of MDIQKD. Reconfigurable QKD [96, 97] proposes an adaptive setup where
the parties switch between the two protocols depending on the degree of confidence they































Figure 5.1: Schematic for implementing the demonstration of the P-RTS method for the
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Interference of short optical pulses from independent gain-switched laser diodes for
quantum secure communications. Phys. Rev. Applied, 2:064006, Dec 2014. 43
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Calculation of the H.O.M. Visibility
parametrization
We assume that the two detectors have efficiencies ηc,d and dark count probabilities dc,d,
respectively, and are blind to the photon number, i.e., a single-photon event cannot be
distinguished from a multi-photon event.
Let P
(out)
mn be the probability that m (n) photons arrive at the detector at port c (d).
Since the ports c and d are separate, the output state |Ψout〉 eq.(4.5) can be factorized into
coherent states:
|Ψout〉 = |γH〉 ⊗ |γV 〉 ⊗ |δH〉 ⊗ |δV 〉 (A.1)
where the coherent states with parameter γi (δi) are in output port c (d), i = H,V , and
γi = (αtε̂a + βrε̂b) · ε̂i , δi = (αrε̂a − βtε̂b) · ε̂i (A.2)
Therefore, we can write the probability P
(out)
mn as a product:
























Using the binomial theorem, we deduce
























|γi|2 = |αtε̂a + βrε̂b|2




|δi|2 = |αrε̂a − βtε̂b|2
= |α|2r2 + |β|2t2 − 2|αβ|tr cos Φ cos(θa − θb + φ0) (A.8)
Notice that φ0 is an irrelevant phase, because we need to average over the phases.
The probability of detection if m (n) photons reach detector c (d) is 1− (1− ηc)m(1−dc)
(1− (1− ηd)n(1− dd)). Therefore, the probability of detection given m (n) photons coming
out of beam splitter port c (d) is
Pmn = [1− (1− ηc)m(1− dc)]
× [1− (1− ηd)n(1− dd)]P (out)mn (A.9)












showing that the effective average photon number is the average photon number of the output
beam that reaches the detector multiplied by the detector efficiency.
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µaµbtr cos Φ) (A.11)
where
C = e−ηc(µat2+µbr2)(1− dc) ,
D = e−ηd(µar2+µbt2)(1− dd) . (A.12)
For the HOM visibility, we also need to calculate the probabilities for one of the two detectors










µaµbtr cos Φ) (A.13)










µaµbtr cos Φ) (A.14)









In the limit α, β → 0 (small average photon number), and in the ideal case of no dark




(Tµa +Rµb)(Rµa + Tµb)
(A.16)
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Its maximum value of 1
2











which vanishes for Φ = π
2
(orthogonal polarizations), and for Φ = 0 (parallel polarizations),
it has maximum 1
2
at µa = µb.
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Appendix B
P-RTS Alice’s state preparation
We assume that Alice has full knowledge of Bob’s detection setup parameters, as summarized
in Tables 3.1 & 3.2, she knows that Bob will apply a selection threshold and also she knows
the channel’s statistics {η0, σ}. For the rest of the section, we follow the notation from
Lim et al. [76] , where X denotes the rectilinear (computational) basis and Z the diagonal
(Hadamard) basis. Alice performs a numerical optimization over the free parameters of her
state : {qX , Pµs , Pµw , µs, µw} where qX is the proportion of the bits encoded in the X-basis ,
Pµsand Pµw are the proportions of the signal state and weak decoy state respectively, µs and
µw are the photon numbers per pulse for the signal and weak decoy states respectively. For
the vacuum decoy state we have fixed µv = 0.001 and Pµv = 1− Pµs − Pµw .
The detection probability for k ∈ {signal, weak, vacuum} at the detector i ∈ {H,V,D,A}:
P iclick (µk) = 1− (1− pibg) · e−η
i
SY S ·µk (B.1)
The error probability
Ei (µk) = 1− (1− p⊥ibg ) · e−emisη
⊥i
SY S ·µk (B.2)
where η⊥iSY S the total transmission leading to detector i i.e. channel transmittance, Bob’s
optical instruments and detector efficiency. Also p⊥ibg is the background noise to the detector
orthogonal to i. To run the numerical optimization that returns the optimal state we need
the number nX,k of detections for which both Alice and Bob choose the rectilinear basis and
Alice had used the decoy intensity k ∈ {µs, µw, µv} and the number mX,k of the erroneous
detections where both Alice and Bob choose the rectilinear basis and Alice had used the decoy
intensity k. We choose to send in total N = 4 · 1010 pulses. For the simulation we define
the quantities Npost = N ·
∫ 1
ηT
p (η) dη as the number of pulses that experience transmittance
higher than the threshold, Pk is the proportion of the state k in Alice’s sequence, r
i is the
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number of available gates i.e. gates not blanked due to the dead-time for each detector
i ∈ {H, V,D,A}. The fraction ri can be estimated for each detector given that the average
photon number is µavg = Pµs · µs + Pµw · µw + Pµv · µv. Then it is,
ri =
1
1 + P iclick(µavg) · `g
(B.3)
In the above `g =
dead-time
trigger period
is the number of blanked gates after each detection. Putting
everything together we have,





ri · P iclick (µk) + Ei · r⊥i
)
(B.4)
mi,k = Npost · Pk ·
qX
2
· r⊥i · Ei (µk) (B.5)
similar expressions hold for the diagonal basis by replacing X → Z , where qZ = 1− qX .




, where ` the number of distilled bits,
` =
⌊








where sX,0 and sX,1 are the contributions to the key rate from zero and single photon pulses
and φX the phase error associated with the single photon events. Their expressions stem
from the three decoy state method [37] extended to include finite-size effects and are taken
directly from [76]. The error correction efficiency was set as fEC = 1.16 , the secrecy criterion
εsec = 10
−10 and the correctness criterion εcor = 10−15. Given the detection parameters of
tables 3.1 & 3.2 , we run a numerical optimization for various turbulence parameters (η0, σ)
that returns the optimal state {qX , Pµs , Pµw , µs, µw}. Based on these parameters we construct
the waveforms for Alice’s decoy and polarization sequences.
Choosing the appropriate scale for the Weak decoy state.
For out 15bit generator the suitable scales that are converted to Voltage amplitude to
modulate vacuum and and signal pulses are trivial. We set the maximum scale 16382 for the
signal and 0 for the vacuum state. To choose the scale for the weak decoy we make a test
measurement to determine the relation between the scale loaded on the generator and the
resulting detection probability. We normalize the data to the signal photon number, 0.527
for the measurements of section 3.5, and we make a polynomial fit to determine the shape of
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the function µ(scale) and calculate the appropriate scale that produces intensity µw = 0.241
for the measurements of section 3.5.
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000



















Figure B.1: Polynomial fit to determine the weak decoy scale.
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